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COMMENTARIES
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INCORPORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Curtis A. Bradley* and Jack L. GoldsmithIn an article last year,1 we critiqued the view that customary international law ("CIL') has the status of self-executing federal common
law, to be "applied by courts in the United States without any need for
it to be enacted or implemented by Congress." 2 We argued that this
view, which we termed the "modern position," lacks historical support
and conflicts with political branch enactments and with broader constitutional principles of separation of powers, federalism, and representative democracy. We concluded that CIL should not be treated as
federal law in the absence of authorization from the federal political
3
branches.
Professor Koh recently responded to our argument in an article entitled Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?4 The title of Koh's article is somewhat misleading, for we have not in fact argued that CIL is
state law. Rather, as Koh at times acknowledges,5 our view is that
CIL should not be a source of law for courts in the United States unless the appropriate sovereign - the federal political branches or the
appropriate state entity - makes it so. Ifaccepted, this argument
would mean, as Koh states emphatically, that CIL in some instances
"[would not be] United States law at all!"6 Koh views this conclusion
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1 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as FederalCommon
Law: A Critiqueof the Modern Position, zio HARv.L. REv. 8x (1997).
2 Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 I&CH. L. REV. 1555, x56x
(1984).

3 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note i,at 849-70. We developed the argument further in
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, II,The Current Illegitimacy of International Human
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Current
Illegitimacy].

4 Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, iii HARv. L. REv. x824
(1998).

5 See id. at 1828 (quoting Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 3495o).

6
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as "radical," "utterly mistaken," and "bizarre."7 Perhaps not surprisingly, we disagree.
Our argument might seem strange, if not radical, when judged
against the backdrop of Koh's conception of constitutional and international law. This conception is essentially as follows. Foreign affairs
is a category distinct from domestic affairs. Although the Constitution
limits federal power in domestic affairs, federal power is plenary and
exclusive with respect to foreign affairs. This exclusive federal foreign
affairs power encompasses the interpretation and application of CIL.
If the federal political branches have not embodied CIL in a federal
treaty or statute, the judicial arm of the federal government should interpret and apply CIL as a matter of federal common law, subject only
to subsequent federal political branch revision. Federal courts have
thus applied CIL without political branch authorization throughout
the nation's history. This regime makes sense because, as "[e]very
schoolchild knows[,] ... the Constitution ...established national gov-

ernmental institutions to articulate uniform positions on such uniquely
federal matters as foreign affairs and international law."" A political
branch authorization requirement would skew this arrangement, according to Koh, because it would mean that in the absence of such
authorization, CIL would not be enforced or would be left to the nonuniform enforcement of the fifty states.9
The common-sense appeal of this picture helps explain its widespread acceptance in the academy. Unfortunately, this picture brushes
over a number of fundamental distinctions, and much of it is either
outdated or incorrect. In this short response, we focus on what we believe to be the four central errors in Koh's analysis: its mistaken use of
history; its conflation of traditional CIL that regulates international
relations with the new CIL of human rights that regulates the way a
nation treats its citizens; its unjustifiably broad conception of the
common law powers of federal courts; and its unwarranted assumption
that all of international law must be incorporated into domestic law.
Before turning to these points, it is important to clarify what is at
stake. There have been few recent decisions and little academic commentary discussing the domestic status of the traditional CIL that governs truly international relations, such as the CIL governing diplomatic immunity. In large part, this is because the federal political
branches have incorporated this traditional CIL into enacted federal
law. Instead, the modern position debate concerns the enforceability
in U.S. courts of the CIL of human rights that purports to confer on
individuals a host of political, social, and economic rights against their
governments. This CIL of human rights derives primarily from mul7

Id. at 1828,

1827,

r85o.

8 Id. at 1825.
9 See id. at 1828-29, 1851-52.
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tilateral treaties that the executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
government either have refused to ratify or have ratified subject to
conditions that render them unenforceable as domestic law. Nevertheless, as Koh's article drives home, the modern position calls for U.S.
courts to apply the norms contained in these treaties, in the form of
CIL, as federal law. Our disagreements with Koh primarily concern
the legitimacy of this practice.

I.

HISTORY

Koh's first major error is his attempt to assign to the modern position a rich and lengthy historical pedigree. Koh asserts that the view
that CIL is self-executing federal common law has been accepted since
"the beginning of the Republic'" and reflects "a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts' function."" He cites, among other
things, nineteenth-century judicial decisions referring to international
law as "part of our law."' 2 Koh maintains that this pedigree places a
heavy burden on any challenge to CIL's status as self-executing federal
law because such a challenge would amount to a "dramatic reversal of
settled doctrine." 13
Koh's historical account neglects monumental conceptual and practical differences between the historical treatment of CIL by federal
courts and the modern position. During the pre-Rrie'4 period, federal
courts with proper jurisdiction applied several bodies of law, including
CIL, as part of "general common law."' 5 They applied general common law as a default in the absence of state or federal legislation to the
contrary. 16 General common law did not have the status of federal
law, and, therefore, CIL did not trump state law and did not provide a
basis for federal question jurisdiction. 17 As a result, in the absence of
10 Id. at 1846.
11 Id. at 1841.
12 Id. at 1831 (quoting The Paquete Habana, I75 U.S. 677, 700 (i9oo)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
13 Id. at 1828.
14 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Is Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note I, at 820-21.
16 See Bradford P, Clark, FederalCommon Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,x44 U. PA. L.
REV. 1245, 1276-87 (i996); Stewart Jay, Origins of FederalCommon Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 1231, 1263-79 (1985); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume no: An Essay on Context in
InterpretiveTheory, 11o HARV. L. REv. 1785, 1790-92 (I997).
17 See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87 (1876) (holding that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to review "general laws of war,as recognized by the law of nations applicable to the case" because these laws do not involve "the constitution, laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United States"); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS 161 (1922) (observing that a "state constitution or legislative provision in
violation of customary international law is valid unless in conflict with a Federal constitutional
provision or an act of Congress"); sources cited supra note 16; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 331-36 (elaborating on CIL's pre-Erie nonfederal status); Brad-
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political branch federalization of CIL, states could, and sometimes did,
depart from federal court understandings of the content of CIL. 18
This is how matters stood until 1938, when Erie eliminated the
federal court practice of applying general common law and held that,
"[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."'19
For decades after Erie, however, the question of C=h's domestic legal
status was rarely litigated and certainly not settled. 20 The federal
courts' silence on the issue raises a puzzle for Koh's attempt to create a
pedigree for the modern position. If a self-executing CIL was so crucial to the Republic, why did courts so rarely apply CIL during the
decades after Erie? One answer is that much of the CIL that courts
had applied in the nineteenth century, such as prize law, had become
irrelevant to domestic litigation. More significantly, the federal political branches began comprehensively to codify CIL in the post-World
War II period. As a result, courts had little opportunity to address
whether there was domestic authorization to apply CIL as a rule of
decision or defense.

ley & Goldsmith, supra note i, at 822-26, 849-52 (describing CIL's pre-Erie nonfederal status in
detail).
18 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note i, at 825-26; see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 2, introductory note, at 41 (1987)

('State and federal courts respectively determined international law for themselves as they did
common law, and questions of international law could be determined differently by the courts of
various States and by the federal courts.").
19 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
20 The only case to address the issue in the three decades following Erie was Bergman v. De
Sieyes, 170 F.2d 36o (2d Cir. 1948), in which Judge Learned Hand looked to state court precedents as governing authority in a diversity case involving the application of a CIL rule of diplomatic immunity. Koh acknowledges that Bergman is inconsistent with the modern position, but
he contends that the decision "now has little precedential weight" in light of Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), which Koh contends approved the modern position. Koh,
supra note 4, at 1833 n.46. We have explained in detail elsewhere, and will not repeat here, why
the Court in Sabbatino did not, as Koh suggests, embrace the view that CIL is federal law. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, CurrentIllegitimacy, supra note 3, at 336-41; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note I,at 828-30, 859-60.
It is worth explaining, however, why Koh errs in claiming that the Court in Sabbatino must
have federalized CIL because otherwise the plaintiff's claim (for conversion of bills of lading)
"would have raised no substantial federal question worthy of Supreme Court review." Koh, supra
note 4, at 1833. Original federal jurisdiction in Sabbatino was premised on diversity of citizenship, see Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 n.2o, and the federal issue reviewed by the Supreme Court
was Cuba's act of state defense, which the Court took pains to make clear was not governed by
CIL, see id. at 421-22, 427. Koh himself once recognized that the Court in Sabbatino did not apply CIL, much less treat it as self-executing federal law. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Public Law Litigation, ioo YALE LJ.2347, 2362-63 (i99i) (noting that the Court in Sabbatino
"declined even to apply international law to review the validity of the act of a recognized foreign
sovereign fully executed within its own territory" and that the decision "cast a profound chill upon
the willingness of United States domestic courts to interpret or articulate norms of international
law - both customary and treaty-based - in both private and public cases").
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Beginning with the Second Circuit's Filartigav. Pena-Iraladecision in 1980,21 however, lower federal courts once again began to apply
CIL as a rule of decision in domestic litigation. But the CIL they applied differed in crucial respects from the CIL applied by courts in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. First, they applied CIL as
federal law, not general common law. Second, in contrast to the traditional CIL that primarily governed relations between nations, the CIL
applied in the post-Filartigaperiod almost exclusively regulates relations between a nation and its citizens on such matters as torture, capital punishment, inhuman and degrading treatment, prolonged arbi22
trary detention, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
Third, the source of this "new" CIL of human rights is substantially
different from that of traditional CIL. Traditional CIL was customary
law that purportedly reflected the actual practices of the community of
nations. 23 The CIL of human rights does not arise in that fashion,
however, because many nations continue to commit human rights violations. 24 Rather, much of the new CIL arises from international proUnited Nations General Asnouncements such as resolutions of the
25
sembly and multilateral treaty regimes.
Koh fails to take account of these fundamental differences between
the traditional- and genuinely international - CIL applied by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century federal courts as nonfederal law,
and the modern CIL of human rights applied by federal courts during
the last twenty years as federal law. Koh's attempt to ground the
modern position in history thus amounts to the following: the nineteenth-century judicial tradition of applying CIL as nonfederal law to
govern the sovereign immunity owed to the King of Spain supports the
application by federal courts in the 199os of CIL that, as a matter of
federal law, might regulate a state's death penalty and prison detention
practices. As this example illustrates, other than the label "customary
international law," the modern position is fundamentally different from
courts' historic application of CIL.
21 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 198o).
22

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note i, at 84o-41.

23 See Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 37 (1995).
24 See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus

Cogens,

and GeneralPrinciples, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 90 (1992).
25 Professor Henkin has described this "purposive creation of custom" through treaties and

General Assembly resolutions as a "radical innovation" that "reflects a radical conception."
HENKIN, supra note 23, at 37. Koh does not discuss these "radical" changes, but he does suggest

(without explanation) that the modem position's federalization of the new CIL be limited to "bona
fide rules" of CIL, Koh, supra note 4, at 1835, "universal, definable, and obligatory" rules of CIL,

id. at 1853 n.i66, and "ripened" CIL, see id. at x859. In light of the many conceptual uncertainties regarding the creation and identification of the new CIL, it is far from clear what Koh's suggested limitations mean or how or why courts should limit the incorporation of CIL along those
lines. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 23, at 29 (referring to the "soft, indeterminate character of custom
and the uncertainties of the process from which it results").
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We should be clear about our claim thus far. We are not arguing
that CIL's status as nonfederal law during much of the nation's history
is, by itself, a reason to reject the modern position. Our only goal here
is to show that the pre-Erie history does not, as Koh and others insist,
support the view that CIL is self-executing federal law. Koh is right
that Erie did not expressly prohibit federal courts from applying CIL
as domestic law, 26 but this observation is beside the point. What is
significant is Erie's rejection of general common law (of which CIL
was a part), and its related requirement that federal courts ground the
application of federal common law in the Constitution or a federal enactment. 27 These elements of Erie, combined with the substantial
changes in the nature of CIL, mean that the pre-Erie precedents by
themselves provide no support for the modern position's application of
CIL as federal common law. Thus, recourse to pre-Erie practice cannot legitimize the modern position's federalization of CIL.
Koh also claims that, since Erie, courts and political officials have
widely embraced the modern position, such that there is a "unanimity
29
of relevant opinion. '28 This historical claim is greatly exaggerated.
International law scholars have, to be sure, broadly endorsed the modern position. By contrast, courts have adopted the modern position
only in narrow circumstances. The lower federal courts that have applied CIL as self-executing federal law have done so almost exclusively
for the purpose of establishing subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving the behavior of foreign state actors on foreign soil.30 Although
Koh suggests that it is settled that CIL governs domestic state officials,
he cites no decision (and we know of none) that has ever squarely held
See Koh, supra note 4, at 1831-32.
27 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (announcing that "tihere is no federal
general common law" and holding that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State"); see generally
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note i, at 856 n.263 (listing sources noting that post-Erie federal
common law must find authorization in the Constitution or a federal enactment).
28 Koh, supra note 4, at 1825. Most of the judicial decisions Koh cites in support of this claim,
see Koh, supra note 4, at 1836-37, nn.62-72, involve the use of CIL as an interpretive guide in
statutory or treaty construction rather than, as the modern position contemplates, a self-executing
federal rule of decision or defense. As we explain below, see infra pp. 2272-73, these decisions do
not depend on the validity of the modern position.
29 One need look no further than the quotations with which Koh opens his article to see that
his claim about the "unanimity of relevant opinion" in support of the modern position is overstated. Koh, supra note 4, at 1825. Koh quotes from a decision that he previously acknowledged
did not apply CIL, see supra note 2o, a footnote from a Carter Administration brief that was later
renounced by the Reagan Administration, see infra note 34, and a snippet of legislative history
from a statute that on its face appears to belie the modern position, see infra p. 2271.
30 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. x98o) (allowing Paraguayan
citizens to sue a Paraguayan government official for acts committed in Paraguay); Xuncax v.
26

Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995) (allowing Guatemalan citizens to sue a Guatemalan government official for acts committed in Guatemala). But see Princz v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 26 F.3d i166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a claim against a foreign government official under CIL did not provide a basis for "arising under" federal question jurisdiction).
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that CIL is federal law within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.3 1
And contrary to Koh's suggestions, the Supreme Court most definitely
has not held that CIL is federal common law.3 2 If anything, recent
Supreme Court decisions, which Koh falls to address, have implied
that CIL is not self-executing federal law.33 Finally, although the po-

litical branches have largely incorporated traditional CIL into enacted
federal law, they have incorporated the new CIL of human rights into
federal law only in very limited circumstances, an approach that belies
34
rather than supports the view that CIL is self-executing federal law.

31 Koh chides us for not citing any examples "in which the states have complained about a
federal court ruling on international law 'invading' their sovereignty." Koh, supra note 4, at 1851.
Because no federal court actually has applied CIL to invalidate a state law, it is not surprising
that there are no such complaints. We suspect that there would be plenty of state complaints if
courts were to begin using CIL to invalidate, for example, state capital punishment schemes otherwise consistent with the Constitution and enacted federal law. Indirect evidence for this claim
is provided by Virginia's recent execution of Angel Breard, a Paraguayan national. Virginia convicted Breard of a capital crime after failing to inform him of his right under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 2i U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261, to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. See Breard v. Greene, Nos. 97-8214 (A-732),
97-1390 (A-738), 97-8660 (A-767), and No. 125, Orig. (A-771), 1998 U.S. LEXIS 2465, at *2-*3
(U.S. Apr. 14, 1998). Paraguay later brought an action against the United States in the International Court of Justice, which ordered the United States to "take all measures at its disposal to
ensure that [Breard] is not executed pending the final decision in these [ICJ] proceedings." Case
Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), International Court of
When the
Justice (Apr. 9, 1998) <http:llwww.icj-cij.orglidocketlipauslipausordero9o498.htm>.
United States Supreme Court subsequently declined to stay Breard's execution, see Breard, 1998
U.S. LEXIS 2465, at *12, Secretary of State Albright officially asked Virginia Governor James
Gilmore to exercise his discretion to stay the execution, but Gilmore let the execution proceed.
See David Stout, Clemency Denied, Paraguayanis Executed, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. i5, 1998, at AiS.
32 Koh claims that, "[b]y 1981, the Supreme Court had come unanimously to 'recogniz[e] the
need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come to be known as "federal
common law"' in cases in which 'a federal rule of decision is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,"' including 'international disputes implicating ...our relations with foreign nations.'" Koh, supra note 4, at 1826 (quoting Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
64o-4x (ig8i) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964))). The passage quoted here was dictum in a decision that held that there is no federal common law right of
contribution from antitrust co-conspirators. See Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 646. The decision
had nothing to do with international law, and it thus provides little evidence of the Supreme
Court's "unanimous- ...recogni[tion]" that CIL is self-executing federal law.
33 For example, in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), the Court rejected
the argument that a criminal prosecution of a person abducted from Mexico by U.S. agents violated the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, and the Court refused to give independent significance to
the CIL prohibition on international abductions. See The Supreme Court, z99z Term - Leading
Cases, io6 HARv.L. REv. 163, 322-23 (1992) ("[Bly chance or design, the Supreme Court disposed
of Alvarez-Machain's potentially viable customary international law defense without analysis.').
Similarly, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 36z (1989),the Court refused to consult international
practice in construing the Eighth Amendment because "it is American conceptions of decency that
are dispositive," and the Court failed to give any independent significance to a possible CIL prohibition on execution of juvenile offenders. Id. at 369 n.i.
34 See infra p. 2271. Koh once again exaggerates when he claims that "the executive branch
has regularly urged the federal courts to determine [rules of customary international law] as matters of federal law." Koh, supra note 4, at 1842. Although some executives have urged courts to
apply CIL as federal law to regulate the behavior of foreign governmental officials on foreign soil,
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THE FALSE UNITY OF CIL

Koh also argues that structural constitutional considerations support the modern position. His best argument in this regard is that CIL
is part of foreign relations law and the Constitution makes foreign relations law exclusively federal law. Under Koh's view, because "the
Tenth Amendment has reserved little or no power to the states" in this
context, 35 the federal judiciary's application of CIL as federal law interferes with no state interest, and thus is consistent with Erie.
There are two problems with this analysis. The first concerns
Koh's claim that the Constitution establishes a judicially enforceable
realm of exclusive federal power in foreign affairs. Koh cites no provision of the Constitution for this proposition, perhaps because the text
fails to support it. Articles I and I of the U.S. Constitution give the
federal political branches numerous executory foreign relations powers,
and Article I, Section io excludes state authority in a defined set of
foreign relations contexts.3 6 The most natural inference from these
provisions and the enumerated power structure of the Constitution is
that all foreign relations powers not denied to the states by Article I,
Section io fall within the concurrent authority of the state and federal
governments until the political branches act to preempt state authority.
Consistent with this inference, for the first 175 years of our nation's
history, the Supreme Court did not recognize a judicially enforceable
realm of exclusive federal power in foreign relations. The Court recognized such a realm for the first time in the i96os. 3 7

The scope of

this federal exclusivity in foreign affairs has been uncertain ever since,

executive views have not been uniform even in this narrow context. For example, in a brief filed
in the Ninth Circuit in the Marcos litigation, the Reagan Administration largely repudiated the
modem position. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 342 n.132.
More broadly, the executive branch has never argued that it should be bound by a judicially federalized CIL, and, indeed, it has in a number of instances defended its right to violate CIL. See,
e.g., Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. at 669-7o; Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 145355 (xith Cir. 1986). In addition, to the best of our knowledge the executive branch has never argued that the new CIL of human rights trumps state law. This makes sense because the Executive has consistently insisted that the human rights treaties on which this CIL is based not be construed to preempt state law. See supra 2261-62; infra note 39 and accompanying text.
35 Koh, supra note 4, at 1832.
36 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § io.
37 See Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432, 436 (1968); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424-27. As
Professor Henkin has correctly noted, the constitutionally-based foreign affairs exclusivity recognized in these decisions was new constitutional doctrine. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 239 (1972) (describing Zschernig); Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoLuas. L. REV. 805, 8o6 (1964) (describing Sabbatino); see generally Jack L. Goldsmith, FederalCourts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism,83 VA.
L. REV. x617, 1641-64 (1997) (explaining in detail why the modem notion of foreign affairs exclusivity lacks basis in historical practice).
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and in recent years the Court has begun to back away from the idea
38
altogether.
The second problem with Koh's structural analysis is more fundamental. To the extent that a constitutionally-based, exclusive federal
power in foreign affairs retains validity, it is justified by the need for
the United States to speak with one voice in its relations with foreign
nations. On its face, the modern position appears to fall within this
rationale because customary international law seems to govern relations among members of the international community. But of course
the label "international" is misleading here. The judicial and academic
treatment of CIL as federal common law during the past twenty years
has almost exclusively been limited to the new CIL of human rights
that purports to govern the relationship between a nation and its citizens. In this context, Erie's relevance becomes clear. Assume that
Koh is right that judicial incorporation of traditional CIL into U.S.
federal law does not implicate federalism concerns because such incorporation is an exclusive federal prerogative. The same cannot be said
of the judicial incorporation of the new CIL, which regulates issues
like criminal punishment that are not exclusive federal prerogatives.
These latter issues are at the heart of what the Constitution permits
states to regulate unless and until the federal political branches, in
which the states and their citizens have a voice, preempt state law
through democratic processes.
Koh's treatment of CIL as a unitary phenomenon also causes him
to overemphasize the vertical issue of federal exclusivity at the expense
of the horizontal issue of what the federal political branches have actually said about CIL's federal law status. Although the political
branches have comprehensively incorporated into federal law the traditional CIL that regulates international affairs, the opposite is true
with respect to the new CIL of human rights. A principal source of
the new CIL is the multilateral human rights treaties that have flourished in the post-World War II period. The United States has not ratified many of these treaties, and when it has, the President and the
38 The leading case in this respect is Barclays Bank PLC v. FranchiseTax Board, 512 U.S. 298
('994), in which the Supreme Court upheld California's controversial international taxation
method against the charge that it "impairfed] federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential" by "preven[t]ing] the Federal Government from speaking with one voice in
international trade." Id. at 320 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
448 (1979); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 320 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court made clear that it lacked the authority to preempt state activity on the basis
of its adverse effects on foreign relations, see id. at 328, and it emphasized that it was the job of
"Congress - whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's - to evaluate whether the national interest
is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy," id. at 331. Koh's attempt to recast Barclays
Bank as a case about deference to the Executive, see Koh, supra note 4, at 1848-49, is contradicted by the Court's insistence that "Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law" were irrelevant to the constitutionality of the California practice,
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 330.
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Senate have consistently conditioned ratification on a now-standard
series of reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that
ensure that the treaty norms do not apply as supreme federal law and
do not affect the validity of inconsistent state law.3 9 These political
branch acts to exclude international human rights law from domestic
federal law are meaningless if, as Koh believes, the CIL based on these
treaties applies with full force as domestic federal law, regardless
whether the United States has ratified the relevant treaty, and regardless whether the Senate and President have conditioned ratification on
the treaty's nonapplication as domestic federal law.40
Ill. THE COMMON LAW POWERS OF FEDERAL

COURTS

Our focus on federal political branch action raises a broader disagreement with Koh regarding the proper common law role of federal
courts in the federalization of CIL. Koh ascribes to us a rigid conception of the federal courts' common law powers. He says that we require an "explicit and unambiguous directive from a federal statute or
treaty" before courts can treat CIL as federal common law,4 1 and that
our argument "would disrupt [the] dynamic framework" by which federal courts exercise federal common law powers in interpreting and
42
applying federal enactments.
Contrary to Koh's representations, we have never suggested that
federal common law is legitimate only if it is sanctioned by an "explicit
and unambiguous" federal directive. There is no doubt that through
interpretation of federal enactments, and by virtue of delegations of
lawmaking power from Congress, federal courts can and must make
federal common law. The problem, however, lies in determining where
legitimate federal common lawmaking authorized by the political
43
branches ends and illegitimate federal common lawmaking begins.
Consider, for example, the difficulties raised by Koh's example of
whether the Queen of England should receive head-of-state immunity
on a visit to the United States."4 This example is much more complex
than Koh suggests. By treaty and statute, the political branches have
comprehensively federalized foreign diplomatic and sovereign immu39 See Peter J. Spiro, The States and InternationalHuman Rights, 66 FoRunAm L. REV. 567,
574 (1997) (noting that "the Senate has consistently refused to effect any changes in state laws by
way of the human rights treaties"); see also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions:The Ghost of SenatorBricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 342-44 (995) (describing and
criticizing this trend).
40 See Koh, supra note 4, at 1828 n.24, 1838-40.
41 Id. at 1828.
42 Id. at 1839.
43 On this point there is much debate among courts and scholars. See, e.g., Symposium on
FederalCommon Law, I2 PACE L. REV. 227, 227-357 (1992).
44 See Koh, supra note 4, at 1829.
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nity.45 On their face, these enactments do not purport to govern headof-state immunity. This has given rise to disputes about the existence
and scope of head-of-state immunity under CIL, 46 and the circumstances, if any, in which federal courts should apply it. Some courts
construe the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)4 7 to govern
head-of-state immunity,4 8 but others view the FSIA as "inapplicable to
a head-of-state" and instead look to executive branch authorization to
apply the doctrine. 49 Among the courts that seek executive branch
authorization, some recognize head-of-state immunity only in the face
of an explicit suggestion of immunity by the Executive,5 0 and others
infer executive branch authorization of immunity from executive
branch silence. 5 ' Importantly, all of these decisions purport to ground
head-of-state immunity in a federal political branch authorization.
Contrary to the modem position, none of the decisions assumes that
the CIL of head-of-state immunity applies as self-executing federal
law.
The head-of-state immunity example illustrates that in some cases
there will be plausible arguments for and against the requisite political
branch authorization for a particular federal common law rule of CIL.
But the existence of shades of gray does not detract from the fact that
much is black and white. This is why it is important to resist treating
CIL as a unitary phenomenon. The term "customary international
law" subsumes a variety of different norms, only some of which the
political branches want to federalize. When the political branches
cannot plausibly be viewed as having authorized the incorporation of
CIL, and especially when they have explicitly precluded incorporation,
federal courts cannot legitimately federalize CIL.5 2

45 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-i6i (1994); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. x8, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
46 As one prominent commentator has noted, head-of-state immunity is "an at best amorphous
legal doctrine whose very existence is not entirely settled in U.S. law and whose reach is almost
completely uncertain." Joseph W. Dellapenna, Case Note, Head-of-State Immunity - Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act - Suggestion By the Department of State: Lafontant v. Aristide, 88
A .J.INT'L L. 528, 531 (I994); see In re Doe, 86o F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. x988); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 817 F.2d iio8, iiio (4th Cir. 1987).
47 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, i6o2-x6ii (i994).
48 See, e.g., Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912

F.2d io95, IOI (9th Cir. 199o).
49 Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, I37 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
50 See, e.g., In re Doe, 86o F.2d at 45-46; Jungquist v. Nahyan, 940 F. Supp. 312, 321 (D.D.C.
I996).
S1 See, e.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 618-i9 (sth Cir. 1974) (dealing with head-of-state
immunity before the passage of the FSIA); see also United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 12o6, I2M2
(iith Cir. 1997) (mentioning but not endorsing this approach).
52 Cf.D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that federal common law "implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by them" (emphasis added)).
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Koh purports to be sensitive to the dynamic interaction between
federal statutory and common law, but he groups together traditional
and new CIL and ignores the varying evidence of political branch intent with regard to each. For example, in sharp contrast to their extensive federalization of traditional CIL, the political branches have
only narrowly federalized the CIL of human rights. The recently enacted Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)5 3 creates a federal cause
of action against foreign governmental actors for the violation of CIL
prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killing. The statute's significant procedural limitations, its failure to address other CIL prohibitions, and additional evidence of congressional intent suggest that
Congress has not authorized the federal courts to apply other aspects
of the CIL of human rights to regulate foreign governmental behavior.5 4 More importantly, the TVPA's express limitation to foreign governmental actors confirms what the Senate and the President have
made clear in their conditional ratifications of multilateral human
rights treaties: with minute exceptions, the federal political branches
55
do not want international human rights law to preempt state law.
53 Torture Victim Protection Act of iggi, Pub L. No. 102-256, io6 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350).
54 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 363-68. Koh misrepresents
our views regarding the significance of the TVPA. He suggests that we said in our first article
that the TVPA codified the modem position, and that we later "reverse[d] course" to argue that
the TVPA rejected the modem position. Koh, supra note 4, at 1844; see also id. at 1859 (stating
that Bradley and Goldsmith have "hardened their position"). We did neither. In our first article,
we referred to the TVPA's federalization of CIL prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killing
as an exemplar of how CIL should be federalized. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note i,at 873.
We later argued that the TVPA's limited incorporation of two specific CIL norms, in combination
with its procedural limitations on this incorporation and other evidence of congressional intent,
suggested that the TVPA did not federalize all of CIL. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 3, at 365-67. Koh complains that we contemplate a "minimal task" for the
TVPA, Koh, supra note 4, at 1845, apparently because we would read the statute, which purports
to federalize only prohibitions on "torture" and "extrajudicial killing," 28 U.S.C. § 135o note (1994)
(Torture Victim Protection § 2(a)(I)-(2)), as federalizing only prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killing.
55 The TVPA expressly limits its causes of action to acts committed by an individual acting
under color of law "of anyforeign nation," 28 U.S.C. § 135o note (1994) (Torture Victim Protection
§ 2(a)) (emphasis added), and thus does not apply to federal or state government officials. Consider also the recently enacted exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for suits
against officials for torture, extrajudicial killing, and certain acts of terrorism. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 16o5(a)(7) (West Supp. 1997). The federal cause of action enacted in conjunction with those
amendments applies only against foreign, not U.S. federal or state, officials. See Civil Liability
for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (1io Stat.
3009) 3009-576. The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994),
evinces a similar political branch solicitude for states' rights. The Act, which implements the
Genocide Convention with respect to conduct within the United States or by a U.S. national,
makes clear that it shall not "be construed as creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any proceeding." Id. § 1092. This provision was designed to
ensure that the Act "create[ no new federal cause of action in civil proceedings," and not "preempt the rights of state and local governments to enact similar legislation." Genocide Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. RnP. No. OO-566, at 8 (1988).
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Koh's claim that the CIL of human rights is federal common law that
preempts state law is inconsistent with these enactments.
Koh's view of the proper role of the federal courts in incorporating
international law is reminiscent of the broad views of federal common
law that reached their zenith during the ig6os and 197os. Koh comes
very close to saying that courts should have as much authority to make
law as Congress does.5 6 He also suggests that federal statutes, including what appear to be purely jurisdictional provisions, should be interpreted broadly as delegating lawmaking power to the federal
courts.5 7 In the past decade, however, the Supreme Court has embraced a different view of the proper scope of federal common law and
its relationship to federal statutes. The Court has criticized the "runaway tendencies of federal common law untethered to a genuinely
'58
identifiable (as opposed to judicially constructed) federal policy.
This concern is especially implicated by the federal common law called
for by the modem position, which is based on sources largely external
to the U.S. legal system and is in tension with numerous policy positions taken by the federal political branches. In other foreign relations
contexts, the Court has construed its common law and interpretive
powers narrowly in order to encourage the federal political branches to
specify the content of federal foreign relations law.59 Koh's proposed
"transnational public law litigation" model, which is self-consciously
based on the Chayesian public law litigation model, 60 is oblivious to
these and other institutional concerns.
A more balanced conception of the dynamic interaction between
courts and the political branches precludes the view that all of CIL is
self-executing federal law. Contrary to Koh's suggestion, such a rejection of the modern position would not prevent federal courts from using CIL-related canons in interpreting federal statutes. 61 The canons
56 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 4, at 1831, 1835-36, 1853-55 (suggesting that a constitutional
delegation of power to Congress, such as the power to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations, should be construed as also authorizing a similar lawmaking power in the federal
courts).
57 See id. at 1835 n.6o (relying on Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (957)).
58 O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 ('994).
59 See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994) (refusing to
preempt state tax law, despite its adverse foreign relations implications and inconsistency with
executive policy, because it is the job of "Congress - whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy");
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 n.i6 (1992) (reading an extradition treaty
narrowly as not prohibiting international abductions, in deference to "the diplomatic approach"
through the Executive); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. 244, 248, 259 (iggi) (applying
the presumption against extraterritoriality in order to avoid "unintended clashes" with foreign law
and "international discord," and inviting Congress to "calibrate [Title VII's] provisions in a way
that [the Court] cannot").
60 Koh, supra note 2o, at 2347-48 (analogizing to the framework described in Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. RaV. 1281 (1976)).
61 See Koh, supra note 4, at 1836-39.
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that ambiguous statutes be construed not to violate in-

ternational law, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and international comity - flourished in the nineteenth century when CIL was
not viewed as federal law.6 2 In addition, the purposes of the canons
are quite different from those of the modern position. Traditionally,
these canons have been used to reduce judicial intervention in foreign
relations matters, attenuate the need for judicial foreign relations
judgments, and promote political branch supremacy.6 3 The modern
position, by contrast, contemplates an expansive foreign relations role
for courts and a related lack of deference to the political branch processes. Finally, these canons do not raise the same federalism concerns
as the modern position because they presumably are not binding on
state courts (or federal courts sitting in diversity) in their application of
64

state law.
Koh contends that if the modern position were rejected, "we would
expect to see proliferation of varying state rules of customary international law."65 This standard refrain from modern position proponents
has initial intuitive appeal, but it ignores the historical evidence and
reflects an unwarranted lack of confidence in the federal political
branches. "[B]alkanization"6 6 never occurred during the 175 years
when CIL was not viewed as federal law and states were legally entitied, in the absence of a preemptive federal enactment, to interpret or
violate CIL. Balkanization did not occur during this period primarily
because the political branches federalized those aspects of CIL that required uniform national treatment. Rejection of the modern position
is much less likely to lead to balkanization today because the political
branches have federalized traditional CIL more comprehensively than
ever. It is possible, of course, that states will disagree about the relevance of the CIL of human rights to their governing institutions.
Nonuniformity on these issues, however, is presumptively acceptable
under our constitutional structure and has been expressly permitted by
federal legislation.

62 See Hilton v. Guyot, c59 U.S. 113, 163-64 (i895) (applying principles of international cornity); United States v. Palmer, i6 U.S. 61o, 632-33 (i818) (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2Cranch) 64, rig (18o4) (applying the
canon that ambiguous acts of Congress should be construed not to violate international law).
63 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separationof Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEo. L.J. 479, 495-504, 524-29 (1998)
[hereinafter Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon] (discussing justifications for the Charming
Betsy canon); Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 5o-19, 55o-6i (1997) (discussing justifications for the presumption
against extraterritoriality).
64 See Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 63, at 533-36; Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of InternationalLaw, i994 SuP. CT. REV. 295,
334 n.i14.
65 Koh, supra note 4, at 1840.
66 See id.
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THE INTERNATIONALIST AssumvrPnoN

The first three errors in Koh's analysis - his misreliance on history, the false unity he claims for CIL, and his overly expansive views
regarding federal common law - can be viewed as the product of a
fourth, overarching error, which we will term the internationalistassumption. The internationalist assumption is that all of international
law must be incorporated into domestic law.
The internationalist assumption permeates Koh's analysis. It underlies his repeated claim that if CIL is not federal law, then it must be
state law.67 It explains his inaccurate charge that we "argue for the
near complete ouster of customary international law rules from federal
judicial interpretation." 68 It is reflected in his extraordinary claim that
if human rights treaty norms are accepted by much of the world community, the norms become CIL that is self-executing, supreme federal
common law both before the United States has ratified the treaty and
after it has ratified the treaty on the condition that the treaty norms
will not apply as domestic federal law. 69 Finally, the internationalist
assumption leads Koh to sound at times as if our liberties depend on
the world community and the federal courts. Thus, for example, he
worries that rejection of the modern position would allow U.S. states
to commit genocide. 70 Suffice it to say that we have more confidence
than Koh in our domestic constitutional and democratic processes.
Koh never defends the legitimacy of his internationalist assumption, and the assumption is in tension with prevailing understandings
of international law and the U.S. Constitution. It is well accepted that
international law does not itself speak to whether or how it applies
within particular domestic regimes, but rather leaves this issue to be
determined by domestic law.71 In the U.S. domestic regime, Erie
makes clear that federal courts cannot apply any norm as federal law
in the absence of some authorization from the Constitution or the federal political branches. And both the Constitution and recent federal
enactments appear to rule out rather than embrace the view that international law in its entirety must be domestic federal law. Articles I
and II of the Constitution specify procedures for political branch incorporation of international law by treaty and statute that would be
unnecessary if the internationalist assumption were correct. The Su67 In addition to the title of his article, see, for example, Koh, cited above in note 4, at 182729, 850, i851-52.

68 Id. at 1828 (emphasis added); see also id. at I84o n.84 (asserting that we argue for a "presumptive ouster" of CIL).
69 See id. at 1828-29 n.24, 1838-4o.
70 See id. at 1840, 185o.
71 See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, RIcHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER & HANS SMIT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS r53 (3d ed. 1993); Edwin Borchard, The Relation
Between InternationalLaw and MunicipalLaw, 27 VA. L. REV. 137, 143 (1940).
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premacy Clause's limitation of supreme federal law to those laws
"made in pursuance[] of" the Constitution and those treaties made
"under the Authority of the United States '72 also suggests that international law does not automatically apply as domestic federal law. 73 Finally, as explained above, 74 the federal political branches have incorporated international law into domestic federal law in carefully
delineated circumstances rather than in the wholesale fashion contemplated by the internationalist assumption.
V

CONCLUSION

Koh's essay is symptomatic of a creeping incoherence at the heart
of foreign affairs law. Much of this law assumes a sharp distinction
between domestic and foreign relations, and between the constitutional
law that governs each. Under this view, domestic relations concern internal affairs and are governed by a relatively rigorous set of constitutional understandings about federalism, separation of powers, and representative democracy. Foreign relations, by contrast, concern external
affairs and are governed by relatively relaxed constitutional understandings.
As the development of international human rights law demonstrates, foreign affairs are in fact no longer distinct from domestic affairs. They increasingly overlap with what has traditionally been
viewed as domestic, or local, concerns. As the distinction between
domestic and foreign affairs wanes, it becomes crucial to identify
which set of constitutional understandings should prevail. Our claim
that CIL is not self-executing federal law is at bottom an argument
that the more rigorous constitutional understandings that normally attend domestic matters must prevail. Koh's contrary claim in support
of the modern position can be seen as an attempt to expand the relaxed understandings of foreign affairs law into the domestic realm, a
problematic step for the reasons we have discussed.
Koh begins his essay by asserting that "even casual reflection compels the conclusion that Bradley and Goldsmith are utterly mistaken."7 5 With due respect, we believe that it is just such "casual reflection" that has led Koh and so many other international law
scholars to overlook the fundamental inconsistencies between the
modern position and this country's constitutional traditions.
72 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
73 See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 508

n.16 (2d ed. x996) (noting that the Supremacy Clause "does not easily include [customary] international law," because CIL is not a treaty and is not made pursuant to the Constitution, but rather is
made by the world community "in a process to which the United States contributes only in an
uncertain way and to an indeterminate degree').
74 See supra pp. 2266, 2271.
75 Koh, supra note 4, at 1827.
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